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Abstract
In the  last year or so, markedly different claims have  view in the debate,  but they need to be considered
been heard within the development community about  carefully  if one is to properly  interpret the evidence. The
just how much progress  is being made against poverty  author argues that the  best available evidence  suggests
and  inequality in the current period of "globalization."  that if the rate of progress  against absolute poverty  in the
Ravallion  provides a nontechnical  overview of the  developing world in the 1990s is maintained,  then the
conceptual  and methodological  issues underlying these  Millennium  Development Goal  of halving  the 1990
conflicting  claims. He argues that the dramatically  aggregate  poverty  rate by 2015  will be  achieved on  time
differing positions taken  in this debate often stem from  in the aggregate,  though not in  all regions.  He concludes
differences  in the concepts  and definitions  used and  with some observations  on the implications  for the more
differences  in data sources and measurement  policy-oriented debates on globalization  and pro-poor
assumptions. These differences  are often hidden from  growth.
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What has been happening to the living standards  of poor people in the world lies at the
heart of the globalization debate.  Indeed, as Amartya Sen has recently argued, the real concern of
the so-called "anti-globalization"  protestors  is surely not globalization per se, for these protests
are amongst the most globalized events in the modern world; rather, their concerns seem to stem
in large part from the continuing deprivations and rising disparities in levels of living that they
see in the current period of globalization  (Sen, 2002).
Are their concerns justified?  There is no denying the perceptions held by the critics of
globalization that poverty and inequality are rising.  For example, the web site of the
International Forum on Globalization confidently claims that "globalization policies have
contributed to increased poverty, increased inequality between and within nations".'  Whether
this is a valid generalization,  or even a valid characterization  for any specific group of countries,
is another matter.
Both sides in the debate have sought support from "hard" data on what is happening to
poverty and inequality in the world.  A "numbers debate" has developed, underlying the more
high-profile protests and debates on globalization.  By some accounts, the proportion of people
living in extreme poverty in the developing world has fallen sharply in the  1990s (Bhalla, 2002;
Sala-I-Martin,  2002).  Other assessments  suggest much more modest gains, including those
regularly published by the World Bank (the latest published update is Chen and Ravallion,
2001).  Yet others claim that globalization has led to greater poverty (International Forum on
Globalization,  2001).
There have been similar disagreements about what has been happening to inequality.  By
some accounts, income inequality has been rising in the world (see for example, International
2Forum on Globalization,  2001,  and Galbraith, 2002, commenting on Dollar and Kraay, 2002a),
while by others (including Bhalla, 2002, and Sala-I-Martin,  2002) it has been falling, though not
continuously.
Who should we believe?  To answer that question, we need to probe more deeply into the
sources of the differences between the conflicting assessments.  This calls for closer scrutiny of
the concepts being used, which are not always in agreement between the two sides of the debate.
It also requires closer inspection of the data sources and methods of analysis,  even when there is
agreement on the concept one is trying to measure.  Only then can one form a judgment as to
what the available data can really tell us about progress against poverty and inequality in the new
era of globalization.  This essay offers a non-technical  commentary on the conceptual and
methodological differences  underlying the "numbers debate" on globalization.
Ambiguous concepts make deceptdve statistics
Before trying to quantify anything, one must first be clear about the concept to be
measured.  Specialists are (typically) precise about these things, but that is not so true in the
popular debate on globalization.
Most observers have a reasonably clear idea about the difference  between "poverty" and
"inequality."  As these terms are normally defined,  poverty is about absolute levels of living -
how many people cannot attain certain pre-determined  consumption needs.  Inequality is about
the disparities  in levels of living - for example, how much more is held by rich people than poor
people.  Measures of poverty and inequality are typically based on household consumption
expenditure  or income normalized for differences  in household size and the cost-of-living.
Aggregate measures of poverty at country or global levels tend to get the most attention, though
finer breakdowns  (such as by geographic  area or ethnic group) are often brought into the picture.
3Some commentators  are less careful about an equally important distinction lingering
under the surface of the globalization debate - between the ideas of "relative poverty" and
"absolute poverty."  The latter typically means that the poverty line has fixed purchasing power.
Relative poverty typically means that the poverty line has higher purchasing power in richer
countries or areas within countries.  How much higher is a matter of debate; this depends  on how
important relative deprivation  is to a person's assessment of his or her well-being,  and that is not
something we know much about. Economists have traditionally assumed that people only care
about their own consumption, but there is now a body of evidence suggesting that people do hold
"social preferences,"  and that relative deprivation is an important determinant of welfare and
behavior.2  There is wide agreement that a person's own income is far too narrow a basis for
judging economic well-being.  To the extent that this depends on relative income, measures of
poverty in terms of welfare will need to use poverty lines that vary with the mean income of
some relevant reference group.  Putting that into practice in a convincing way is another matter.
The measurement choice does matter. Roughly speaking, the more "relative" your
poverty measure, the less impact economic growth will have on its value.  Those who say
globalization is good for the world's poor tend to be undisguised "absolutists."  By contrast,
many critics of globalization appear to think of poverty in more relative terms.  At one extreme,
if the poverty line is proportional  to mean income then it behaves a lot like a measure of
inequality; this has actually been popular in poverty measurement in Western Europe.  This
method can show rising poverty even when the levels of living of the poor have in fact risen.
That is surely an extreme position that would seem hard to defend.  While we can agree that
relative deprivation matters, it appears to be very unlikely that individual welfare  depends only
on one's relative position, and not at all on absolute levels of living, as determined by incomes.
4A further distinction is between the ideas of "relative inequality" and "absolute
inequality."  In applied work, economists typically mean "relative inequality" when they talk
about the effects of greater trade openness on inequality.  Relative inequality depends on the
ratios of individual incomes to the overall mean.  (The precise nature of that dependence - the
weight given to income disparities  at different levels, for example - has been the subject of a
large literature.3)  So if all incomes grow at the same rate then relative inequality is unchanged.
A common finding in the academic  literature is that greater trade openness has roughly the same
effect on the growth rate of income at different levels of income.4 Then openness  can be said to
be "distribution-neutral"  in that (relative) inequality is unchanged on average.
But that is not the only defensible concept of inequality.  "Absolute inequality" depends
on the absolute differences in levels of living, rather than relative differences, as captured by the
ratios to the mean.  Consider an economy with just two household incomes:  $1,000 and $10,000.
If both incomes double in size then relative inequality will remain the same; the richer household
is still  10 times richer.  But the absolute difference  in their incomes has doubled, from $9,000 to
$18,000.  Relative inequality is unchanged but absolute inequality has risen.
Perceptions on the ground that "inequality is rising" appear often to be referring to this
concept of inequality.  Indeed,  in experiments used to identify which concept of inequality is
held by people, it was found that 40% of participants thought about inequality in absolute terms.5
It is not that one concept is "right" and one "wrong."  They simply reflect different value
judgments  about what constitutes higher "inequality."
These value judgments carry considerable weight for the position one takes in the
globalization  debate.  Finding that the share of income going to the poor does not change on
average with growth does not mean that "growth raises the incomes (of the poor) by about as
5much as it raises the incomes of everybody.else"  as claimed by an article in the Economist
magazine (May 27, 2000, p.94), referring to Dollar and Kraay(2000a).  Given existing
inequality, the income gains to the rich from distribution-neutral  growth will of course be greater
than the gains to the poor. In the above example of two households, the income gain from
economic growth is  10 times greater for the high-income person; to say that this means the poor
share fully in the gains from growth is surely a stretch.  And the example  is not far fetched.  For
example, for the richest decile in India, the income gain from aggregate  growth will be about
four times higher than the gain to the poorest quintile; it will be 15-20 times higher in Brazil or
South Africa.
A further source of confusion underlying  the conflicting claims that have been made
about what has happened, to "inequality" in the world in the current period of globalization stems
from lack of clarity about whether one is talking about inequality between countries or between
people (wherever they live).  Some of the,  claims about rising "inequality" have been based on
the fact that, looking back over the last 40 years  or so, initially poorer countries  have tended to
experience lower subsequent growth rates (see, for example,  Pritchett,  1997).  But of course
countries vary enormously in population size.  If one takes account of this, then the picture of
rising inequality changes dramatically.  Total inequality between people in the world can be
thought of as having two components: the amount of inequality between countries and the
amount within countries.  Since one naturally weights by population when calculating overall
inequality, the between-country  component is also population weighted.  Given the population
weighting,  the between-country component has tended to fall, even though poorer countries have
not tended to have higher growth rates (see, for example,  Schultz,  1998,  and Bhalla, 2002).  The
two largest countries naturally figure prominently in this finding,  China and (more recently)
6India have enjoyed high growth rates and this has been a major contributing factor to lowering
overall inequality in the world.
Nor can it be denied that there is evidence of rising inequality within many countries,
including China and India.  Rising inequality is not, however, correlated with growth rates;
indeed, amongst growing economies, inequality tends to fall about as often as it rises (Ravallion
and Chen,  1997; Ravallion, 2001).
Combining the between and within country pictures, there is no convincing sign of a
significant trend increase in overall inequality between people over the last 20 years or so; nor is
there convincing evidence of a trend decline in inequality.
The devll is An  tihe detals
Conceptual ambiguities  are not the only reason for the conflicting claims that one finds in
the globalization debate.  There are also differences  in how the available data have been
interpreted and differences  in the underlying assumptions made in measurement.
Let us now focus on absolute poverty.  All the estimates I have seen suggest a trend
decline in the incidence of poverty and the total number of poor over the bulk of the 1980s and
1990s.6 Progress was not been even over time. There is evidence of an increase in the number of
poor in the late  1980s and early 1990s (Chen and Ravallion,  2000).7  However,  this sub-period is
not typical,  and it is not too surprising that progress against poverty was stalled then, given
simultaneous macroeconomic  difficulties in the two largest countries, China and India, on top of
the weak growth in Africa. If one focuses instead on the period since about 1990, all sources I
know of suggest a sustained decrease in the number of poor by any absolute standard.  This is
also evident if one looks at estimates going back to  1980 and before (Bourguignon and
Morrisson,  2002; Sala-I-Martin, 2002; World Bank, 2002).8
7While there appears to be broad agreement that absolute poverty is tending to fall, there
are some large discrepancies  amongst the available estimates of the rate of progress being made
against absolute poverty. I will focus on two recent estimates.  In the first, Bhalla (2002) presents
estimates of the incidence of absolute poverty in the developing world that imply that the United
Nations' Millennium  Development Goal (MDG) of halving the 1990 "$/day" poverty rate by
2015 was in fact already reached in 2000.
Contrast this with the World Bank estimates for the 1990s which suggest that the MDG
for poverty will be reached on time if the rate of progress since 1990 is maintained (World Bank,
2000).  This is based on the numbers reported in World Bank (2000), comparing  1990 and 1998.
This implies a drop in the $1/day poverty incidence of about 0.6 percentage  points per year,
which would be sufficient to halve the  1990s poverty rate by 2015.9  On updating this estimate
using the latest available data, we find a mean annual rate of decline over the in the 1990s of 0.7
points per year, which (if maintained)  would mean that the MDG for poverty would be achieved
slightly ahead of time.'0
These two sources differ in other respects.  For example, Bhalla's estimates indicate that
the incidence of poverty in South Asia is well below average for the developing world as a
whole, while the Bank finds above average poverty for that region.  However, here I will focus
on the difference  in the aggregate numbers - similar reasons underlie the differences  in regional
composition.
How could two estimates of roughly the same thing be so different?  Have we really
achieved the MDG for poverty,  15  years ahead of time, as Bhalla claims?  To answer this
question we need to look inside the black box of poverty measurement.
8I  To measure poverty one first needs a poverty line.  Different people naturally have
different ideas of what "poverty" means. This is true between countries as well as within a given
country.  Richer countries tend to have higher poverty lines when converted to a common
currency at exchange rates that attempt to assure purchasing power parity (PPP).  Amongst poor
countries, there is very little income gradient in the poverty lines - absolute consumption needs
tend to dominate in a poor country.  But as incomes rise, societies naturally tend to alter their
views as to what minimum standard of living is deemed acceptable.  So poverty lines rise with
mean consumption.
Recognizing this feature of how poverty lines vary, how should we measure poverty in
the world as a whole?  There are two approaches that have been taken.  The relative poverty
approach uses poverty lines that increase with mean income of the country.  For example, Chen
and Ravallion (2001) present results for a relative poverty line which rises with mean income
above a critical level,  as determined by the aforementioned  empirical relationship  between actual
poverty lines and mean consumption across countries.  This is arguably a better approach than
setting a poverty line that is proportional to mean income, which tends to give either absurdly
low poverty lines in poor countries, or absurdly high ones in rich countries.
However, all such relative poverty lines do not treat people with the same level of
consumption the same way, and so the resulting measures would clearly lose meaning as
measures of absolute income poverty.  Since 1990, the World Bank has chosen instead to
measure global poverty by the standards of what poverty means in poor countries, which gave
the "$1/day"  line (Ravallion, et al.,  1991; World Bank,  1990, 2000). This poverty line is then
converted to local currency using the latest PPP exchange rates for consumption and local
9consumer price indices are then used to:`convert the international poverty line in local currency to
the prices prevailing at the time of the survey.
It is fully acknowledged that this is a conservative definition; while one could hardly
argue that the people in the world who are poor by the standards typical of the poorest countries
are not in' fact poor, there are many more poor people in the world who are poor by the standards
of middle-income countries.  Some observers have argued that the World Bank has
systematically underestimated the extent of poverty using its $1/day line and'argue  that a higher
line should be used;"  still others have argued for a lower line.  However,  there is no escaping the
fact that there is a degree of arbitrariness  about any poverty lire.  Provided one is consistent
across countries, one can test whether the regional comparisons  and assessments of progress over
time are robust to such differences.
Having set a poverty line, one counts how many people live belo'w it.  Over the last 20
years there has been considerable  expansion  in the coverage and frequency of the household
surveys that allow one to calculate the proportion of the population living in households with
consumption expenditures  and/or inc'omes per-person below' the poverty line.  Such surveys are
currently the most widely used source of data for measurin"g'poverty  in the world.
It is important to recognize that these surveys come with numerous problems. In the
international comparisons of the "$/day" poverty rates' done by the World Bank, only surveys
that meet certain quality criteria - arguably quite minimal criteria  -are  included.  The surveys
must be nationally representative,  include a sufficiently comprehensive  consumption or income
aggregate (including consumption or income from own production)  and it must be possible to'
construct a correctly weighted distribution of consumption or income per person.
10The Bank's researchers found that the latter requirement was often not met by pre-
existing data sources, so they have insisted on being able to get back to the original "raw"
household-level  data sets rather than rely on summarized tabulations  from secondary sources to
assure that the calculations are done consistently.  By building up the global poverty numbers
from the primary data - either the raw micro data or special-purpose  tabulations designed to
meet uniform quality criteria - past errors or inconsistencies in estimating distributional
statistics can be dealt with.  The latest published up-date used over 300 surveys since the mid-
1980s for measuring global poverty, representing 90 countries  (Chen and Ravallion, 2001).  At
the time of writing, the data base included 400 surveys representing  100 countries.
Nonetheless,  there are still numerous comparability problems across these various
surveys.  For example,  some use income while some use consumption to measure well-being.
There are also comparability problems  amongst surveys in the questionnaires used - such as
differences  in recall periods for consumption - that can matter greatly to the results obtained.
Some observers in the globalization debate have chosen to largely ignore these differences.  Yet
others find casual anecdotal observations more persuasive. For example, Secor (2003) quotes an
academic contributor to the globalization  debate as rejecting existing quantitative data showing
lower inequality in Indonesia than Australia; the support given by the academic for his claim that
the existing qualitative data are wrong is that "You can check that out by going to the capital city
and driving in from the airport.  You can see it ain't so."  Thankfully, most observers would not
find a drive into the capital city from the airport more persuasive  than a well-designed
nationally-representative  sample survey of households (as is done in both Australia and
Indonesia).But even if the surveys are entirely accurate,  it must be acknowledged that the measure of
poverty obtained can still miss important aspects of individual welfare.  Using household
consumption ignores inequalities within households.  Nor does it reflect peoples'  concerns about
uninsured risk to their incomes and health as well as their feelings about relative deprivation,  as
already discussed.  A conventional poverty measure  can hardly be considered  a sufficient
statistic for judging the quality of people's lives.
Even putting these concerns to one side, there are numerous differences  in the methods
used to measure the incidence of poverty in the world. 1 2 How one deals with the diversity in the
underlying survey data is an important factor.  Some researchers have indiscriminately mixed
distributions that vary in important ways.  For example, some are distributions of household
income (not per capita)  and the poorest x% in some surveys refers to households while others
follow the methods used by the Bank's researchers  in which they refer to people. These
differences  can matter greatly to the measures one obtains of poverty and inequality.  The fact
that household (rather than per capita) distributions were more common in the 1960s and '70s
than  1980s's and '90s also biases comparisons  over time, given that household distributions tend
to show higher inequality (given that inequality within households is invariably ignored for lack
of data).  Signs of falling inequality may simply reflect this fact, rather than a real change in
distribution.
However,  these differences may well be less important than others.  While many
researchers  prefer to use the consumption expenditures or incomes reported  in surveys, some
have preferred to anchor their poverty measures to the consumption or GDP means  obtained
from a country's  national accounts.  This is the method used by Bhalla (2002),  Sala-I-Martin
(2002)  and UNCTAD (2002).  This method ignores the absolute levels of consumption  or
12income found in all these surveys.  By exploiting the mathematical properties of poverty
measures, the published quintile shares of from surveys are combined with the published national
accounts aggregates  to come up with estimates of the incidence of poverty. This method tends to
show a higher rate of poverty reduction over the last 20 years than the survey-based method.
The researchers  who measure poverty using the national accounts admit that they are
doing so as a matter of convenience;  it is just a whole lot easier to do it this way than by going
back to all those messy micro household-level  data sets.  But they also argue that it is better to
obtain mean household consumption or income from the national accounts rather than the
surveys that were designed for that purpose.  They argue that surveys tend to underestimate mean
household consumption and income (especially  income).  They point to the discrepancies
between survey aggregates  and national accounts  aggregates.  To some extent these
discrepancies  reflect differences  in the coverage and definitions of the two data sources.  The
differences  also stem from measurement  errors in both sources.
However, for the purpose of estimating the amount of poverty it is actually immaterial
which gives the better estimate of average household consumption or income.  The key question
is which data source gives the better estimate of the poverty measure - that is after all the object
of the exercise.  Even if one agreed that the national  accounts are right, there is no reason for
assuming that the errors  in the surveys leave inequality unaffected.  For various reasons
(including fear of taxation or legal action), the rich tend to underreport their incomes,  and this is
thought to be a much more serious problem (in both its absolute level and proportionately)  than
for the poor.  It has not been established,  and is quite unlikely from what we know, that the
discrepancy between these two data sources is entirely due to underestimation of consumption or
income levels in the surveys but that they still get inequality right.  More plausibly,
13underestimation  of mean income from a survey tends to come hand-in-hand with an
underestimation  of the extent of inequality.
To see why anchoring poverty measures to the national accounts can go so wrong,
consider the following simple example.  The true but unobserved distribution of income is (say)
1,2,3  (person 1 has an income of 1, person 2 has income  2, person 3 has 3). The poverty line is
slightly above 1, so the true poverty rate is  1/3.  We do a survey, and the three people respond
that their incomes are 1, 1.5 and 2.  This also gives the right poverty rate.  However,  the survey
underestimates  the true mean; the survey mean is  1.5.  Now let's assume (for the sake of
argument) that the national  accounts do give the right mean of 2.  If we assume that the survey
under-estimation  is distribution-neutral  then we multiply all three incomes  by 4/3.  The
"corrected"  incomes are 1.3,  2 and 2.7 - implying that there is no poverty.  We get the mean
right, but the poverty measure is way off the mark.
This is just an example.  However,  it may not be far fetched.  One study found that the
mean income of the  10 highest income households  in each of 18 surveys for countries in Latin
America was generally no more than the average salary of the manager of a medium to large
sized firm (Szekely and Hilgert, 2000).  Clearly there is massive under-reporting by the rich.
Careful  data work has also been revealing about the sources of the discrepancies between
surveys  and national accounts,  and has thrown considerable  doubt on methods of measuring
poverty that assume that the national accounts get the mean right and that survey under-reporting
is distribution neutral.  For India it has been found that for categories of consumption accounting
for over 75% of the consumption of the poor, the divergence between the national accounts and
the national household surveys  is small (Sundaram and Tendulkar,  2001).  Simply multiplying
all incomes or consumptions by a single number so that the survey gives the same mean as the
14national accounts results in a serious overstatement of the consumption expenditure  of the poor
and hence produces a spurious reduction in the headcount index.
Recent research has studied how poverty and inequality measures from survey data can
best be corrected for the tendency of richer households to not want to participate  in such surveys
(Mistiaen and Ravallion, 2002).  Results for the U.S. suggest that without such corrections,
surveys tend to appreciably underestimate both the mean and the extent of income inequality, but
that these two effects are roughly offsetting for measures of poverty.  Very little correction is
needed for the incomes of the poorest few deciles, but the correction  factors are as high as 30-
50% for the richest decile. Again this makes clear just how wrong one can be in assuming that
the income under-estimation  in surveys is distribution-neutral.
The key point is that simply correcting the survey mean need not get you a better measure
of poverty, even if you believe that the national accounts  give you the correct mean for
measuring poverty, which is far from obvious.  If you don't believe the overall survey mean,
how can you believe the distribution of income obtained from the same survey?
Dubious claims about the welfare impacts of globalzatlon
People on both sides of this debate have been quick to draw conclusions  about the
impacts of "globalization"  from their favorite poverty numbers.  The title of a recent book by the
International Forum of Globalization  asks: "Does globalization help the poor?" and the book
answers with a confident "no."  The back cover of Bhalla (2002) asks: "Who has gained from
globalization?"  and answers with equal confidence:  the poor.  Yet readers of neither book will
come away any wiser about the answer to these questions than when they started. In fact neither
book contains the sort of analysis that would be needed to credibly allow attribution of the
claimed changes in poverty and inequality to "globalization."  We are not given any evidence that
15would allow one to identify the role played by greater openness to external trade (as one aspect
of "globalization")  in the distributional  changes observed, versus other factors such as rising
agricultural productivity,  demographic factors, changes  in the distribution and returns to
education and internal policy reforms.
More careful analytic work has attempted to identify the causal  effects of (for example)
greater trade openness on aggregate inequality, with controls for at least some of the other factors
that are likely to matter.  A number of attempts to throw empirical light on the welfare effects of
trade liberalization have been made using aggregate cross-country data sets, whereby levels of
measured inequality or changes over time in measured inequality and/or poverty are combined
with data on trade openness and other control variables.'3 An example can be found in the
careful econometric  analysis using cross-country panel data set found in Dollar and Kraay
(2002a), who find no sign that greater openness to external trade is either good or bad for
(relative) inequality, and hence that the poor tend to benefit (absolutely).
However,  there are also reasons to be cautious in drawing implications from these
studies.  There are concerns about data and methods and it is unclear how much power cross-
country data sets have for detecting any underlying effects of greater openness or other
covariates.  The attribution of inequality impacts to trade policy reforms per se is particularly
problematic.
One way in which the correlations  (including lack of correlation)  found in these studies
can be deceptive is that starting conditions vary a lot between reforming countries.  Simply
averaging across this diversity in initial conditions can readily hide systematic effects of
relevance to policy.  For example, countries  differ in their initial level of economic development.
It is often argued that greater openness to external trade will have very different effects on
16inequality depending on the level of economic development - increasing inequality in rich
countries and decreasing  it in poor ones.'4 However, the opposite outcome is possible when
economic reforms, including greater openness to external trade, increase demand for relatively
skilled labor, which tends to be more inequitably distributed in poor countries than rich ones.
There is some evidence of a negative interaction effect between openness to trade and initial
GDP per capita in regressions  for inequality across countries (Barro, 2000; Ravallion, 2001).
These problems  can be dealt with using more sophisticated methods to analyze the
compilations of country aggregates, such as by allowing for nonlinearities  through interaction
effects between trade openness  and initial conditions.  However, the problems go deeper.
Aggregate inequality or poverty may not change with trade reform even though there are both
gainers and losers at all levels of living. In cases in which the survey data have tracked the same
families over time, it is quite common to find considerable churning under the surface.'5 Some
people have escaped poverty while others have fallen into poverty, even though the overall
poverty rate has moved rather little.  Numerous sources of such diverse impacts can be found in
developing country settings.  For example, geographic  disparities in access  to human and
physical infrastructure between and within developing countries can impede prospects for
participating  in the growth generated by reform,  and these disparities tend to be correlated with
incomes. 16
Consider the case of China, which has recently undertaken a major trade reform, namely
its accession to the WTO in 2001.  One cannot possibly understand how this reform will affect
the population simply by looking at its impact on (say)-the aggregate poverty rate or overall
inequality. The economic geography of poverty and how this interacts with the geographic
diversity in the welfare impacts of policy reforms is crucial to understanding  its impact.  In the
17aggregate,  the results of Chen and Ravallion (2002)  indicate,a small positive impact on mean
household income, with slightly lower poverty in the short term as a result of the reform.' 7
However,  there is still a sizable, and at least partly explicable, variance in impacts across
household characteristics.  Rural families tend to lose; urban households tend;to gain.  There are
larger impacts in some parts of the country than others; for example,  one finds non-negligible
welfare losses amongst agricultural  households in the North-East - a region in which rural
households are more dependent on feed grain production (for which falling relative prices are
expected fro,m WTO  accession) than elsewhere in China.
Past analyses in the literature that simply averaged.over  these differences  would miss a
great deal of what matters to the debate on policy.  Reforms may well entail sizable.
redistribution between the poor and the rich, but in opposite directions  in different countries or
different regions within countries.  One should not be surprised to find that there is no correlation
between growth and changes in inequality, or that there is no overall impact of policy reform on
inequality.  Yet there are real welfare impacts under the surface of this average impact
calculation.  Claims made about the distributional  impacts of trade reform using cross-country
comparisons  are of questionable relevance  for policy in any specific country.
Lessons  for how to achieve  pro-poor growth
What is "pro-poor growth"?  By one definition it is a situation in which incomes of the
poor grow at a higher rate than the non-poor.'8  The problem with this definition is that
distributional changes  can be "pro-poor" with no absolute gain to the poor, or even falling living
standards for poor people.  Equally well, "pro-rich" distributional shifts may have come with
large absolute gains to the poor.  Instead, Ravallion and Chen (2003) define pro-poor growth  as
growth that reduces poverty by some agreed measure.
18Amongst those who know the survey-based evidence, I don't think you will find much
disagreement with the claim that economic growth is typically (though by no means invariably)
pro-poor,  in the specific  sense that absolute poverty (measured against a poverty line with fixed
real value) tends to fall with growth.  Many observers have gone from this observation to
conclude that policies that are known to be good for growth are good for poverty reduction.' 9
This does not follow.  Growth-promoting  policies often have distributional implications that
cannot be ignored if one is interested in the impacts on poverty.
The case of India is instructive.  Poverty incidence  in India has been falling at a trend rate
of about one percentage point per year since about 1970, and the country appears now to have
returned to this trend decline since the macroeconomic  difficulties of the early 1  990s (Datt and
Ravallion,  2002). However,  performance has been uneven between states. Some states have been
doing far better than others, both in the longer term, and in the wake of economic reforms over
the last  10 years.
But the growth rate needed to achieve this trend decline has been rising over time. The
responsiveness  of national poverty incidence to both non-agricultural  output per capita and
agricultural  yields have been declining over time, especially so for non-agricultural  output (Datt
and Ravallion, 2002; Ravallion and Datt, 2002).
Here the geographic composition of India's growth has played an important role:
widening regional disparities and limited growth in lagging areas has made the overall growth
process less pro-poor over time.  By and large, economic growth in India has not occurred in the
states where it would have the most impact on poverty nationally.  These differences  in the
impact of growth on poverty relate in tum to differences  in access to infrastructure and social
19services  (health care and education) that make it harder for poor people to take up the
opportunities afforded by aggregate  economic growth (Ravallion and Datt, 2002).
Such heterogeneity in the impact of growth on poverty holds important clues as to what
else needs to be done by governments  to promote poverty reduction,  on top of promoting
economic  growth.  According to some observers "such actions are not needed... Growth is
sufficient. Period." (Bhalla, 2002, p.206). The basis of this claim is the evidence that poverty
reduction has generally come with economic growth.
But that misses the point.  Those who are saying that growth is not enough are not
typically saying that growth does not reduce absolute income poverty,  which (as an empirical
generalization)  is hard to deny.  They are saying that combining  growth-promoting  economic
reforms with the right policies to help assure that the poor can participate  fully in the
opportunities unleashed by growth will achieve more rapid poverty reduction than would be
possible otherwise.  Redressing the antecedent inequalities  of opportunity within developing
countries as they open up to external  trade is crucial to realizing the poverty-reducing potential
of globalization.  That is the real challenge facing policy makers striving for pro-poor growth.
20Notes
I  http://www.ifg.org/store.htm
2  See, for example, the discussion  in Fehr and Fischbacher  (2002) and references  therein. On the
implications for poverty measurement  see Ravallion (1998).
3  For a recent survey see Cowell (2000).
4  See, for example, Dollar and Kraay (2002a,b).
5  The source is Amiel and Cowell (1999). Participants in these experiments were students in the
UK and Israel.
6  Bhalla (2002), Bourguignon and Morisson (2002), Chen and Ravallion (2000, 2001), Sala-I-
Martin (2002), World Bank (2000, 2002).
7  This is apparently why Fischer (2003, p.8) claims that "For some time it was the accepted view is
that the proportion of  people living in poverty in the world has been declining but their absolute  number
has been increasing"  (a view which he then takes issue with); Fischer refers to the "World Bank" as the
source.
8  World Bank (2002) claims that 200 million people escaped absolute poverty in the world as a
whole over 1980-2000.  This estimate has been questioned by Wade (2002) and others on the grounds that
it is obtained by combining different sources  (namely the estimates of Bourguignon and Morrison, 2002)
up to 1992  and those of Chen and Ravallion (2000) after that.  Shaohua Chen and I have subsequently re-
estimated our series back to the early 1980s to check the claim made in World Bank (2002).  Data
coverage and quality deteriorate  as one goes back further in time.  While recognizing this limitation, our
estimates suggest that if anything the 200 million figure is probably an underestimate.
9  Reddy and Pogge (2002) and Wade (2002) (though apparently drawing solely on Reddy and
Pogge) argue that the World Bank's estimates (as reported in World Bank, 2002, and Chen and Ravallion,
2002) underestimate the level of poverty and overstate its rate of decline in poverty, though they do not
present alternative estimates to support this claim. Elsewhere I have addressed in detail the
methodological concerns raised by Reddy and Pogge (Ravallion, 2002a).
10  This calculation was made by Shaohua Chen using the same methods documented in Chen and
Ravallion (2000, 2001) but updating the data set used there to include surveys not available at that time.
The estimates for India in the  1990s used an adjustment method proposed by Deaton (2001) to deal with a
serious comparability problem between the 1999/2000  survey design and previous surveys.
I  I  Examples include Wade (2002) and Reddy and Pogge (2002).
12  For a detailed discussion of the differences between the methods used by Bhalla (2002), for
example, and the World Bank see Ravallion (2002b).
13  Examples include Bourguignon and Morisson (1990), Edwards (1997), Li et al., (1998),
Lundberg and Squire (1999), Barro (2000), Dollar and Kray (2002).
14  Wood (1994) makes a qualified argument along these lines.
15  Baulch and Hoddinott (2000) compile evidence for a number of countries.
16  In the context of China's lagging poor areas, see Jalan and Ravallion (2002).
17  The study used a general equilibrium model to estimate the effects of the trade reform on prices
and wages and a large household survey to estimate the household level welfare  impacts; for further
details see Chen and Ravallion (2002).
18  See for example, Kakwani and Pernia (2002), who define pro-poor growth as a situation in which
the actual change in poverty over time is greater than the change that would be expected if inequality
(strictly the Lorenz curve) did not change.
19  For example Fischer (2003,  p.3) argues that ". ..the surest route to sustained poverty reduction is
economic  growth.  Growth requires good economic policies."  Fischer then goes on to discuss policies that
are thought to be good for growth.
21References
Amiel, Yoram and Frank Cowell,  1999, Thinking about  Inequality: Personal  Judgment and
Income Distributions,  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press.
Barro, Robert, 2000, "Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries," Journal  of Economic
Growth 5: 5-32.
Baulch,  Bob and John Hoddinott, 2000, "Economic Mobility and Poverty Dynamics in
Developing Countries," Journal  of  Development Studies 36(6):  1-24.
Bourguignon, Francois and Christian Morisson,  1990, "Income Distribution, Development and
Foreign Trade," European  Economic Review 34:  1113-1132.
and  , 2002, "The Size Distribution of Income Among
World Citizens, 1820-1990", American Economic Review, 92(4):  727-44.
Bhalla, Surjit, 2002, Imagine There's No Country: Poverty, Inequality and Growth in the Era of
Globalization (Institute for International  Economics, Washington DC, 2002).
Chen, Shaohua and Martin Ravallion,  2000, "How Did the World's Poorest Fare in the  1990s?"
Policy Research Working Paper 2409, World Bank (http://wblnO0I8.worldbank.orEI
Research/workpapers.nsf/).
and  ,  2001, "How Did the World's Poorest Fare in the 1990s?"
Review of  Income and Wealth, 47: 283-300.
and  ,2002,  "Household Welfare  Impacts of China's Accession
to the WTO," mimeo, Development Research Group, World Bank.
Cowell, Frank A. 2000, "Measurement of Inequality," in A.B. Atkinson and F. Bourguignon
(eds) Handbook of Income Distribution,  Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Datt, Gaurav and Martin Ravallion,  2002, "Has  India's Post-Reform Economic  Growth Left the
Poor Behind,", Journal  of  Economic Perspectives, 16(3): 89-108.
Deaton, Angus, 2001, "Adjusted Indian Poverty Estimates for 1999-00," mimeo, Research
Program in Development  Studies, Princeton University.
Dollar, David and Aart Kraay, 2002a, "Growth  is Good for the Poor", Journal  of  Economic
Growth, 7(3):  195-225.
and  , 2000b, "Spreading the Wealth," Foreign  Affairs, 81(1):  120-133.
Edwards,  S.,  1997, "Trade Policy, Growth and Income Distribution," American Economic
Review, Papers  and Proceedings  87(2).Fehr, Ernst and Urs Fischbacher, 2002, "Why Social Preferences Matter: The Impact of Non-
Selfish Motives on Competition,  Cooperation and Incentives," Economic Journal 112:
CI-33.
Fischer,  Stanley, 2003, "Globalization and its Challenges," Ely Lecture to the American
Economics Association,  American Economic Review, forthcoming.
Galbraith, James K., 2002, "Is Inequality Decreasing?" Foreign  Affairs, 81(4):  178.
International  forum on Globalization,  2001, Does Globalization  Help the Poor?  A Special
Report, International  forum on Globalization,  San Francisco,  CA.
Jalan, Jyotsna and Martin Ravallion,  2002, "Geographic Poverty Traps? A Micro Model of
Consumption  Growth in Rural China", Journal  of Applied Econometrics 17(4): 329-346.
Kakwani, Nanak and Ernesto M. Pemia, 2003, "What is Pro-Poor Growth?" Asian Development
Review,  18(1):  1-16.
Li, Hongyi, Lyn Squire and Heng-fu Zou, 1998, "Explaining International and Intertemporal
Variations in Income Inequality", Economic Journal  108: 26-43.
Lundberg, Mattias  and Lyn Squire,  1999, "Growth and Inequality: Extracting the Lessons for
Policy-Makers",  mimeo, World Bank.
Mistiaen, Johan and Martin Ravallion, 2002, "Survey Compliance and the Distribution of
Income," Policy Research Working Paper 2542, World Bank, Washington DC.
Pritchett, Lant, 1997, "Divergence,  Big Time," Journal  of  Economic Perspectives 11(3): 3-17.
Ravallion,  Martin,  1994, Poverty Comparisons, Chur, Switzerland:  Harwood Academic Press
, 1997, "Can High Inequality Developing Countries Escape Absolute Poverty?"
Economics Letters, 56: 51-57.
. 1998, Poverty Lines in Theory and  Practice,  Livings Standards Working
Paper 133,  World Bank, Washington DC.
. 2000. "Should Poverty Measures be Anchored to the National Accounts?"
Economic and Political Weekly  34 (August 26): 3245-3252.
, 2001.  "Growth, Inequality and Poverty: Looking Beyond Averages,"  World
Development 29(11):  1803-1815.
. 2002a. "How Not to Count the Poor: A Reply to Reddy and Pogge," mimeo,
Development Research Group, World Bank.
23. 2002b. "Have We Already Met the Millennium Development Goal for
Poverty?" Economic and Political  Weekly,  37 (November  16).
Ravallion,  Martin and Shaohua  Chen, 1997. "What Can New Survey Data Tell Us about Recent
Changes in Distribution and Poverty?,"  World Bank Economic Review,  11(2):  357-82.
and  , 2003. "Measuring  Pro-Poor Growth," Economics Letters,
78: 93-99.
Ravallion, Martin and Gaurav Datt, 2002. "Why Has Economic Growth Been More Pro-Poor in
Some States of India than Others?", Journal  of Development Economics 68: 381-400.
Ravallion, Martin, Gaurav Datt and Dominique van de Walle,  1991, "Quantifying Absolute
Poverty in the Developing World", Review of  Income and Wealth 37: 345-361.
Reddy, Sanjay G., and Thomas W.  Pogge, 2002, "How Not to Count the Poor," mimeo, Barnard
College, New York.
Sala-I-Martin,  Xavier, 2002, "The World Distribution of Income (Estimated from Individual
Country Distributions)," mimeo, Columbia University.
Schultz, T. P.,  1998, "Inequality in the Distribution of Personal Income  in the World:  How it is
Changing and Why." Journal  of Population  Economics, 11(3):  307-344.
Secor, Laura, 2003, "Mind the Gap:  The Debate Over Global Inequality Heats Up," Boston
Globe, Jan. 5 (http://www.boston.com/dailvglobe2/005/focus/Mind  the  gap+.shtml).
Sen, Amartya, 2001, "Globalization,  Inequality and Global  Protest," Development, 45(2):  11-16.
Sundaram, K., and Suresh D. Tendulkar, 2001,  "NAS-NSS Estimates of Private Consumption for
Poverty Estimation:  A Disaggregated  Comparison for 1993-94," Economic and Political
Weekly (January 13):  119-129.
Szekely, Miguel and Marianne  Hilgert, 2000, "What's Behind the Inequality We Measure?  An
Investigation Using Latin American Data", mimeo, Office of the Chief Economist,
Inter-American  Development Bank,
Washington DC., (2000).
UNCTAD, 2002, The Least Developed Countries Report, Geneva: United Nations.
Wade, Robert, 2002, "Are Global Poverty and Inequality Getting Worse?," Prospect  Magazine,
March.
Wood, Adrian,  1994, North-South Trade, Employment and  Inequality. Changing  Fortunes in a
Skill-Driven World. Oxford:  Clarendon Press.
24World Bank,  1990,  World Development Report: Poverty, New York:  Oxford University Press.
, 2000,  World Development Report: Attacking Poverty, New York: Oxford
University Press.
, 2002, Globalization, Growth and  Poverty, World Bank, Washington  DC.
, 2003, Global Economic Prospects, World Bank, Washington DC.
25Policy Research  Working Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS3011  Renegotiation  of Concession  J  Luis Guasch  April 2003  J Troncoso
Contracts in Latin America  Jean-Jacques  Laffont  37826
Stephane  Straub
WPS3012  Just-in-Case  Inventories. A Cross-  J Luis Guasch  April 2003  J Troncoso
Country Analysis  Joseph Kogan  37826
WPS3013  Land  Sales and Rental Markets  in  Klaus Deininger  April  2003  M Fernandez
Transition  Evidence from  Rural  Songqing Jin  33766
Vietnam
WPS3014  Evaluation of Financial Liberalization  Xavier Gin6  April 2003  K Labrie
A General  Equilibrium Model with  Robert  M.  Townsend  31001
Constrained Occupation Choice
WPS3015  Off and Running"  Technology, Trade,  Carolina Sanchez-Paramo  April 2003  H Sladovich
and the Rising Demand  for Skilled  Norbert  Schady  37698
Workers in Latin America
WPS3016  Partisan  Politics and  Stuti Khemani  April 2003  H  Sladovich
Intergovernmental Transfers  in India  37698
WPS3017  Why is Unemployment so High  Jan  Rutkowski  April2003  J  Rutkowski
in Bulgaria?  84569
WPS3018  Integrating  the Least  Developed  Paul Brenton  April  2003  L Tabada
Countries into the World Trading  36896
System  The  Current Impact of EU
Preferences under Everything  but Arms
WPS3019  Foreign Aid,  Conditionality, and Ghost  Thilak Ranaweera  April 2003  P. Rathan  Raj
of the Financing Gap  A Forgotten  33705
Aspect of the Aid  Debate
WPS3020  Consumption,  Health,  Gender,  Anne  Case  April 2003  D  Ballantyne
and Poverty  Angus  Deaton  87198
WPS3021  Institutional Arrangements  for Public  Elizabeth Currie  April 2003  M  Rosenquist
Debt  Management  Jean-Jacques Dethier  82602
Eriko Togo
WPS3022  Sending Farmers  Back to School:  Gershon Feder  April  2003  P Kokila
The  Impact of Farmer Field Schools  Rinku  Murgai  33716
in Indonesia  Jaime B. Quizon
WPS3023  Productivity Growth  and Product  Douglas  M Addison  Apnl 2003  D Addison
Variety:  Gains from  Imitation and  31188
Education
WPS3024  R&D and Development  Daniel Lederman  April 2003  P Soto
William F. Maloney  37892
WPS3025  Trade Structure  and Growth  Daniel Lederman  Apnl  2003  P Soto
William F. Maloney  37892
WPS3026  Strategic Approaches to  Science  Robert Watson  April  2003  R Watson
and Technology  in Development  Michael Crawford  36965
Sara  FarleyPolicy Research  Working  Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS3027  Financial Intermediation  and Growth.  Genevieve Boyreau-  April 2003  P  Sintim-Aboagye
Chinese Style  Debray  38526
WPS3028  Does a Country Need a Promotion  Jacques Morisset  April  2003  M  Feghali
Agency to Attract Foreign  Direct  36177
Investment? A Small Analytical Model
Applied to 58 Countries
WPS3029  Who Benefits and How Much? How  Alessandro  Nicita  April 2003  P. Flewitt
Gender Affects Welfare  Impacts of a  Susan Razzaz  32724
Booming  Textile Industry
WPS3030  The  Impact of Bank  Regulations,  As11  Demirgu,-Kunt  Apnl  2003  A. Yaptenco
Concentration, and Institutions on  Luc Laeven  31823
Bank Margins  Ross Levine
WPS3031  Imports,  Entry, and Competition  Law  Hiau Looi Kee  April 2003  P.  Flewitt
as Market  Disciplines  Bernard Hoekman  32724
WPS3032  Information  Diffusion  in  International  Alejandro  lzquierdo  April 2003  M.  Feghali
Markets  Jacques Morisset  36177
Marcelo Olarreaga
WPS3033  The  Role of Occupational Pension  Dimitri  Vittas  April 2003  P.  Infante
Funds in  Mauritius  37642
WPS3034  The Insurance  Industry in  Dimitri  Vittas  April 2003  P.  Infante
Mauritius  37642
WPS3035  Traffic Fatalities and Economic  Elizabeth Kopits  April 2003  V. Soukhanov
Growth  Maureen Cropper  35721
WPS3036  Telecommunications  Reform  in  George  R.  G.  Clarke  Apnl  2003  P.  Sintim-Aboagye
Malawi  Frew A. Gebreab  37644
Henry  R.  Mgombelo
WPS3037  Regulation and Private  Sector  Sheoli  Pargal  April  2003  S. Pargal
Investment in  Infrastructure:  81951
Evidence from Latin America